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ABSTRACT
The FPGA (field programmable gate array) is widely used in various fields of industry. FPGAs can be
used to perform functions that are safety critical and require high reliability, like in automobiles, aircraft
control and assistance and mission-critical applications in the aerospace industry. With these merits,
FPGAs are receiving increased attention worldwide for application in nuclear plant instrumentation and
control (I&C) systems, mainly for Reactor Protection System (RPS). Reasons for this include the fact
that conventional analog electronics technologies are become obsolete. I&C systems of new Reactors have
been designed to adopt the digital equipment such as PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) and DCS
(Distributed Control System). But microprocessors-based systems may not be simply qualified because
of its complex characteristics. For example, microprocessor cores execute one instruction at a time, and
an operating system is needed to manage the execution of programs. In turn, FPGAs can run without an
operating system and the design architecture is inherently parallel. In this paper we aim to assess these
and other advantages, and the limitations, on FPGA-based solutions, considering the design guidelines
and regulations on the use of FPGAs in Nuclear Plant I&C Systems. We will also examine some circuit
design techniques in FPGA to help mitigate failures and provide redundancy. The objective is to show
how FPGA-based systems can provide cost-effective options for I&C systems in modernization projects
and to the RMB (Brazilian Multipurpose Reactor), ensuring safe and reliable operation, meeting licensing
requirements, such as separation, redundancy and diversity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Conventional relay and analog electronics technologies used in original I&C systems of
most nuclear plants are becoming obsolete. Utilities have been replacing these older sys-
tems with more modern microprocessor-based equipment. Also I&C systems of new nu-
clear reactors have been designed to adopt digital equipments such as PLC (Programmable
Logic Controller) and DCS (Distributed Control System)and many microprocessor-based
systems are in operation in plants worldwide.
But microprocessor-based systems have proved to have a short lifetime, becoming obsolete
much more quickly than the conventional hardware. Also gaining regulatory approval for
microprocessor-based systems in safety applications proved to be much more difficult,
mainly due to the added complexity associated with software [1]. This is one of the
reasons why the interest in the use of field programmable gate array (FPGA) devices in
nuclear plants has increased in recent years.
FPGAs offer the promise of greater simplicity and less burdensome regulatory approval.
This is so because the end product can be designed such that it is purely hardware, sim-
ilar to conventional analog electronics [1]. FPGAs also provide the capability to protect
against obsolescence by circuit independent, i.e., portable circuit to different FPGA ar-
chitectures. But even though the final product is a hardware component, the design and
implementation of an FPGA-based system has strong similarities with software-based
systems [7]. So, design issues on using FPGA-Based I&C systems in nuclear reactors
have to consider a life cycle similar to software. This life cycle is consistent with the
one suggested by IEC 62566 standard [2], the only nuclear-specific international standard
published providing requirements or recommendations for Category A applications based
on programmable complex electronic components, like FPGAs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2. contain informations about FP-
GAs, advantages and limitations as compared to other technologies. Later, in Section 3.,
we discusses design issues on using FPGAs. Last, in Section 4., we draw some conclusions
and point out some directions for future work.
2. FPGA TECHNOLOGY
Figure 1 illustrates the types of electronic hardware technologies that can be applied in
nuclear plant I&C systems.
Figure 1: Electronic Hardware Technologies Used in I&C Systems.
Conventional electrical and electronic components, including relays, analog electronics,
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and digital electronic components technologies are rapidly becoming obsolete. Program-
mable logic devices (PLDs) fit into the overall landscape of electronic hardware technolo-
gies, including conventional technologies, ASICs and microprocessors. Application Spe-
cific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are custom-designed and fabricated at the integrated
circuit foundry. ASICs are cost-effective only when a much larger number of copies of the
circuit will be deployed. FPGAs also can be considered PLDs, but they have a different
internal architecture. A common basic architecture, illustrated in Figure 2, includes:
• A set of configurable logic blocks (CLBs).
A CLB can be configured to implement any logic functions (AND, OR, XOR, NOT,
etc.). Each CLB can be configured to implement an N-to-M Boolean function using
simple logic gates, or may be configured to use a look-up table (LUT) to implement
the logic function. Multiple CLBs can also be interconnected to generate more
complex functions. The output of each CLB includes a flip-flop for synchronizing
the data flow within the FPGA.
• A set of programmable Input/Output (I/O) blocks.
• An internal interconnection grid.
• Application data memory (RAM Block).
Figure 2: Typical FPGA architecture.
An FPGA is designed to be configured by a customer or a designer in field, after be-
ing manufactured. Because, once programmed, an FPGA executes only that program
repetitively and link only the functions needed for a given I&C application, they are
substantially simpler than microprocessors, minimizing the risk posed by complexity [6].
2.1. Design life cycle to FPGAs
The design and implementation of an FPGA-based system has strong similarities with
software-based systems. Despite the similarities with software design, aspects of hardware
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design must be understood by the designer. The levels of abstraction that a software-
based system offers are not present in FPGA design. There is no system level or an
operating system behind which the hardware issues are hidden. On the other hand,
the complexity caused by the shared computing environment and interaction with other
programs is absent [7]. For applications with strict reliability and safety requirements, a
design life cycle similar to software should be used. A safety-critical system is a system
whose failure or malfunction may result in serious injury to people, loss or serious damage
of equipment or environmental harm [4]. A safety-critical system requires care in their
specification and design in order to avoid errors that should result in unexpected systems
behavior.
The FPGA programming process is usually composed of four main phases, along with
the associated verification and validation activities, a life cycle consistent with the one
suggested by IEC 62566 standard [2], as illustrated in Figure 3. The four phases are:
• Component requirements specification. These requirements usually result from the
I&C system architectural design.
• Preliminary design. Decide on the major design choices: balance between combina-
torial logic and sequential design, decomposition into modules, the implementation
of defensive design practices, the identification of the circuit or circuit family to be
used, etc.
• Design. In this phase we develop a detailed description of the logic processing to
be performed by the FPGA component. The design is usually expressed using a
Hardware Description Language (HDL). A number of languages are available such
as Verilog and Very-High-Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description
Language (VHDL).
• Implementation. Implementation is usually divided into two main steps: synthesis
and place&route. The synthesis tool translates the circuit-independent (RTL) into
an equivalent description that is expressed in terms of the resources provided by the
selected FPGA circuit. The place&route tool calculates the best physical positions
and mapping for the FPGA resources that are used. Lastly a bitstream is generated.
The bitstream is the digital data that is sent to the FPGA circuit to program it.
2.2. FPGA - advantages and limitations
In the FPGA design process (Figure 3), only the final steps (synthesis plus place&route)
are dependent on the particular FPGA circuit chosen. Thus, provided that the initial
I&C system design incorporates appropriate provisions for this, when the circuit becomes
obsolete it can be replaced by another one using the currently-available technology and
the same RTL level representation of the design, as showed at Figure 4.
FPGAs also has adequate capabilities for a wide range of applications because can pro-
cess independent functions in a parallel hardware implementation and with high clock
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Figure 3: V-shaped Field Programmable Gate Array programming life
cycle [1].
Figure 4: Porting applications to a new or different FPGA circuit vendor [1].
speeds. When specifically designed to support safety applications and to comply with nu-
clear industry standards, FPGAs are simpler, more reliability than microprocessor-based
systems.
Also, concerned to cyber-security, FPGA-based solutions have characteristics that tend to
increase the level of difficulty that would be faced by a would-be attacker as compared to
conventional microprocessor-based systems [1]. Malicious functions must be introduced as
complete designs, using technology-specific engineering tools, raising the level of difficulty.
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Though not an advantage of the technology as such, simply by being different from mi-
croprocessors, FPGAs provide an opportunity for a diverse implementation [7].
Limitations on the use of FPGA results mainly from the need for specialized expertise on
design team. The design team needs to have HDL coding expertise and an understanding
of software-like development and V&V processes to ensure that the design meets the
application requirements [1]. The HDL description is not software code that will be
translated into computer instructions to be run on a machine, but rather is a description
of the behavior of a circuit.
3. DESIGN ISSUES ON USING FPGA
There are three main technologies applied for storing (memorizing) the configuration of the
interconnection grid and the configurations of the CLBs and I/O blocks in an FPGA [1]:
• SRAM - static random access memory or SRAM is re-writable, which means that the
implemented functionality can be modified without physically replacing the FPGA
component.
• Flash and EPROM - erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM) and flash
technologies are re-writable and non-volatile. with SRAM the programming is not
retained by the circuit on a loss of power.
• Antifuse - this technology is non re-writable and non-volatile.
It is considered that the best choice for safety-critical systems, such as those in nuclear
plants, is antifuse technology. The non-volatility and non re-programmability prevent
accidental and malicious changes to functions Antifuse also has the best resistance to
radiation citeToshiba.
The majority of FPGA families are SRAM-based. This option are volatile. Thus, at
power-up they must be reloaded from an external configuration system. Also, most
SRAMs are susceptible to random, radiation-induced hardware alterations (so-called Single-
Event Upsets, or SEUs). SEU is a “soft” error that changes the state of a bistable element.
A SEU affecting a combination part makes a transient error in logic gates. This can be
propagated to the sequential part and make a bit-flip error. Figure 5 illustrates how an
SEU makes a bit-flip error in a flip-flop. This susceptibility should be addressed as re-
quired in the design, based on the expected environment and the risks associated with
the impact of SEUs [1].
Among all SEU mitigation techniques, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) has become
the most common practice because of its straightforward implementation and reliable re-
sults. The TMR mitigation scheme uses three identical logic circuits performing the same
task in parallel with corresponding outputs being compared through majority voters [8].
Figure 6a shows a representation of TMR with a single majority voter.
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Figure 5: Bit-flip error caused by SEU [3].
(a) TMR with a single majority voter. (b) TMR with three majority voters.
Figure 6
The function of the majority voter is to output the logic value (“1” or “0”) that corre-
sponds to at least two of its inputs. For example, if two or more of the voters three inputs
are a “1”, then the output of the voter is a “1”. The logic gate representation of the
majority voter is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Majority Voter Circuit [5].
Another flexible fault mitigation method is triple device redundancy (TDR) in which a
single FPGA design is replicated three times in redundant FPGA devices, as showed in
Figure 8. These devices could be from different technologies (SRAM, Antifuse). TDR can
filter multiple event upsets, multiple transient upsets, and any other functional interrupts
including total device failure [8].
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Figure 8: TMR implemented for the entire device.
3.1. Diversity
FPGA-based equipment provides an attractive design option when Diverse Actuation
Systems (DAS) are required according to current regulations to prevent common cause
failures. FPGA-based equipment can provide a more practical and cost-effective solution
compared to providing a diverse microprocessor-based system, or when diversity require-
ments demand a non-microprocessor-based solution [1]. Applications allow to use two
additional kinds of the diversity [9]:
• FPGA vs MP(Microprocessor-based) - main system is developed using FPGAs,
diverse system is developed using MPs.
• FPGA1 vs FPGA2 - different manufacturers (Altera, Xilinx, Actel-Microsemi), tech-
nologies (SRAM, Flash, Antifuse) development techniques are used to develop main
and diverse systems.
Also is possible the diversity between two logic cores in the FPGA [1]. This is achieved
through use of different synthesis directives. Once the HDL is created, it is synthesized
differently for the two different cores, resulting in a different hierarchical structure, finite
state machine encoding, and state decoding for each core. A self-test circuit detects any
mismatch between the outputs of the two parallel diverse logic cores.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the authors have presented issues on using FPGA-Based I&C Systems.
FPGA is relatively new digital technology in the nuclear industry. A notable feature
of FPGAs is its simplicity compared with microprocessor-based systems. FPGA-based
systems do not need any operating system, and can implement application logic directly
into the FPGA circuits. FPGA-based systems also can provide cost-effective options for
I&C systems in nuclear reactors, ensuring safe and reliable operation.
For safety-related applications, it is of overriding importance to keep the design as simple
as possible. This helps avoid problems in the final product and makes verification and
validation easier. We presented some methods to keep the design simple while addressing
regulation requirements such as diversity and redundancy.
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Hardware design expertise when designing FPGA-based systems is necessary. But with
the advent of HDL and tool suites that allow FPGAs to be programmed by people who
may only have software expertise, the need for electrical engineering design expertise is
often overlooked. The main point is that both aspects are important a good understand-
ing of software development processes and V&V to ensure that no errors are designed into
the programming of the FPGA, and a good understanding of hardware design issues to
ensure reliable operation of the device [1].
The demands arising from new projects in Brazil, as I&C modernization projects and
the RMB (Brazilian Multipurpose Reactor), will bring the need of new professionals on
training in regulation and guidance regarding the use of FPGA technology in the nuclear
industry. A practical application of the study results will allow the development of a
specification for a new FPGA-based instrumentation to the Argonauta Reactor of IEN
(Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear).
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